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ENVIRONMENTAL LAW-Draft Impact Statements Under
the National Environmental Policy Act-The Interstate Com-
merce Commission as the Responsible Agency Must Make the
Threshold Determination of Whether an Environmental Impact
Statement is Required; If the Statement is Required, the Com-
mission Staff Must Prepare and Circulate a Draft Impact State-
ment Prior to a Hearing Before an Administrative Judge.
Harlem Valley Transportation Association v. Stafford, 500 F.2d 328
(2d Cir. 1974).
In 1973, there were several proceedings pending before the Inter-
state Commerce Commission (ICC) wherein the agency was asked
to approve the abandonment of all or portions of railroad lines in
the Northeast.' Plaintiffs, a group of public interest associations,
business firms, and individuals who resided in the Harlem Valley,'
brought suit in the United States District Court for the Southern
District of New York to enjoin the ICC from acting upon those
1. The proceedings were brought pursuant to 49 U.S.C. §§ 1(18)-(20)
(1970).
2. The issue of the plaintiffs' standing was contested in the district
court but not on appeal. The assertions by the individual plaintiffs that
because of their limited funds they would be unable to present a complete
analysis of environmental factors involved, that they would suffer from
increased noise and air pollution caused by the replacement of trains by
trucks, and that they would suffer economic injury and personal inconve-
nience were found to confer standing pursuant to United States v. Stu-
dents Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures, 412 U.S. 669 (1973), and
Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972). In Sierra the Court found that
"[alesthetic and environmental well-being, like economic well-being, are
important ingredients of the quality of life in our society, and the fact that
particular environmental interests are shared by the many rather than the
few does not make them less deserving of legal protection through the
judicial process." Id. at 734. Plaintiff organizations, such as the National
Resources Defense Council, had standing to sue on behalf of their affected
members pursuant to Sierra because of their interest and expertise in
environmental policy implementation, satisfying the dictates of Baker v.
Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962), by lending the required adverseness that would
clarify the issues before the court. Harlem Valley Transp. Ass'n v. Staf-
ford, 360 F. Supp. 1057, 1064-65 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), aff d, 500 F.2d 328 (2d
Cir. 1974). See generally 40 BROOKLYN L. REv. 421 (1973). The chairman
of the ICC, George Stafford, in both his individual and designated official
capacity, was made codefendant with the ICC.
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applications,3 claiming that they or their members would suffer in-
convenience and economic hardship if rail service were terminated.'
They contended that the ICC had failed to comply with the Na-
tional Environmental Policy Act (NEPA)5 in determining whether
to approve the abandonment of rail service. A single judge enjoined
the ICC approval, holding that the Commission must determine at
the outset of an abandonment proceeding whether "'major federal
actions significantly affecting the quality of the human
environment'" were involved.7 Such a "threshold determination"
would require the ICC staff to prepare an environmental impact
statement under NEPA. s If such a statement were required, the ICC
staff would have to prepare a draft environmental impact statement
prior to any hearing on the proposed abandonment.
3. Harlem Valley Transp. Ass'n v. Stafford, 360 F. Supp. 1057
(S.D.N.Y. 1973).
4. Id. at 1064.
5. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-47 (1970) [hereinafter cited as NEPA]. See
generally F. ANDERSON, NEPA IN THE COURTS: A LEGAL ANALYSIS OF THE
NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL PoucY AcT (1973); Seeley, The National Envi-
ronmental Policy Act: A Guideline for Compliance, 26 VAND. L. REV. 295
(1973). The plaintiffs complained that NEPA § 102(2)(C), in particular,
had not been complied with by the ICC. See note 15 infra for the text of
section 102(2)(C).
6. 360 F. Supp. at 1060-61.
7. Id. at 1066.
8. That a railroad abandonment proceeding could require the prepara-
tion of an environmental impact statement was made clear in City of New
York v. United States, 337 F. Supp. 150 (E.D.N.Y. 1972). In that case the
district court decided that an order of the ICC authorizing abandonment
of an entire railroad line was invalid because of the failure of the ICC to
prepare a statement. The Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ), dis-
cussed at note 26 infra, had issued guidelines concerning the circumstan-
ces that might require preparation of draft impact statements. 35 Fed.
Reg. 7390-93 (1970), revision proposed, 36 Fed. Reg. 1398-1402, guidelines
published, 36 Fed. Reg. 7724-29 (1971). The court found these guidelines
inadequate, basing its decision on the ICC's determination that railroad
abandonment proceedings could constitute "'major Federal actions signif-
icantly affecting the quality of the human environment.'" 337 F. Supp. at
158, citing ICC Notice of Proposed Rule Making: Implementation of Na-
tional Environmental Policy, 36 Fed. Reg. 10807, 10809 (1971).
9. 360 F. Supp. at 1060-61.
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The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit af-
firmed,'" determining that the ICC staff had to participate in mak-
ing the threshold determination and in preparing the statement if
required." Further, the court held that the ICC's environmental
impact statement must accompany the abandonment proposal
through the review process, which included hearings."
NEPA was enacted as a statement of federal attitude toward the
protection of the environment.'3 It was designed to induce federal
leadership in the battle to protect and enhance the quality of the
national environment.' 4 All federal agencies were mandated to insti-
tute procedures and policies which were in accord with the national
environmental goals set out in NEPA.'5
10. Harlem Valley Transp. Ass'n v. Stafford, 500 F.2d 328 (2d Cir.
1974), aff'g 360 F. Supp. 1057 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
11. Id. at 336-37.
12. Id. at 337.
13. As set forth in NEPA § 101(b), 42 U.S.C. § 4331(b) (1970), the goals
of the federal environmental policy are to: "(1) fulfill the responsibilities
of each generation as trustee of the environment for succeeding genera-
tions; (2) assure for all Americans safe, healthful, productive, and aestheti-
cally and culturally pleasing surroundings; (3) attain the widest range of
beneficial uses of the environment without degradation, risk to health or
safety, or other undesirable and unintended consequences; (4) preserve
important historic, cultural, and natural aspects of our national heritage,
and maintain, wherever possible, an environment which supports diversity
and variety of individual choice; (5) achieve a balance between population
and resource use which will permit high standards of living and a wide
sharing of life's amenities; and (6) enhance the quality of renewable re-
sources and approach the maximum attainable recycling of depletable
resources."
14. Exec. Order No. 11,514, 35 Fed. Reg. 4247 (1970).
15. Id. The basic implementing provision of NEPA is section 102 which
provides, in pertinent part: "The Congress authorizes and directs that, to
the fullest extent possible: (1) the policies, regulations, and public laws of
the United States shall be interpreted and administered in accordance
with the policies set forth in this chapter, and (2) all agencies of the Federal
Government shall. . . .(C) include in every recommendation or report on
proposals for legislation and other major Federal actions significantly af-
fecting the quality of the human environment, a detailed statement by the
responsible official on- (i) the environmental impact of the proposed
action, (ii) any adverse environmental effects which cannot be avoided
should the proposal be implemented, (iii) alternatives to the proposed
1975]
FORDHAM URBAN LA W JOURNAL
Fundamental to the purpose of NEPA are the procedural provi-
sions of section 102, which were included in the Act to ensure that
federal agencies do in fact make "exploration and consideration of
environmental factors an integral part of the administrative
decision-making process." 6 The language of section 102 indicates
that it applies to "all agencies of the Federal Government."' 7 There
can be no doubt that the ICC is included within the ambit of the
statute. Indeed, in 1971 the ICC issued a notice of proposed rule-
making for implementation of national environmental policy
wherein it not only recognized its duty to fulfill the requirements of
NEPA but also promised to take the necessary steps to implement
that duty:
This Commission must and will implement the directives of the NEPA and
related pronouncements. We must and will investigate the methods of meet-
ing these statutory directives to create a more meaningful relationship be-
tween this Commission's regulatory responsibilities and the Nation's battle
to save the environment. Our regulatory duties are broad, and we are daily
confronted with a sweeping variety of cases .... We must and will, there-
fore, adopt practical procedures that are adaptable to the wide variety of
cases we handle."
Under section 102(2)(C), an environmental impact statement is
required whenever a proposal before a federal agency constitutes a
action, (iv) the relationship between local short-term uses of man's envi-
ronment and the maintenance and enhancement of long-term productiv-
ity, and (v) any irreversible and irretrievable commitments- of resources
which would be involved in the proposed action should it be implemented.
Prior to making any detailed statement, the responsible Federal official
shall consult with and obtain the comments of any Federal agency which
has jurisdiction by law or special expertise with respect to any environmen-
tal impact involved. Copies of such statement and the comment and views
of the appropriate Federal, State, and local agencies, which are authorized
to develop and enforce environmental standards, shall be made available
to the President, the Council on Environmental Quality and to the public
as provided by section 552 of Title 5, and shall accompany the proposal
through the existing agency review processes .... " 42 U.S.C. § 4332
(1970).
16. 337 F. Supp. at 160. See also Greene County Planning Bd. v. FPC,
455 F.2d 412 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 849 (1972); Calvert Cliffs'
Coordinating Comm. v. AEC, 449 F.2d 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
17. See note 15 supra.
18. 36 Fed. Reg. 10807 (1971).
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"major federal action" which will have a "significant" effect on the
environment." There has been continuous litigation involving the
interpretation of this provision, due in large part to the language of
the section, which offers little interpretative guidance for those
charged with making the threshold decision.2"
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia in Calvert
Cliffs' Coordinating Committee v. AEC, 2 one of the first
cases involving construction of NEPA to reach an appellate court,
found section 102(2)(C) to constitute a mandate to consider "envi-
ronmental values at every distinctive and comprehensive stage of
the [agency's] process .... "22 This interpretation was relied on
in a subsequent Second Circuit case, Greene County Planning
Board v. Federal Power Commission.3 Here the Federal Power
Commission (FPC), in connection with an application by the Power
Authority of the State of New York (PASNY) to construct a power
complex, conceded that a major federal action significantly affect-
ing the environment was involved. Nevertheless, the FPC con-
tended that its staff was not required to prepare an impact state-
ment since the statement prepared by PASNY would suffice for a
hearing before an administrative judge. 4 Having determined that
19. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (1970).
20. See, e.g., Hanly v. Kleindienst, 471 F.2d 823 (2d Cir. 1972), cert.
denied, 412 U.S. 908 (1973). See generally Greis, The Environmental Im-
pact Statement: A Small Step Instead of a Giant Leap, 5 URBAN LAW. 264
(1973); 26 S.C.L. REV. 119 (1974).
21. 449 F.2d 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
22. Id. at 1119. The Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) had issued a
permit for the construction of a power plant prior to the effective date of
NEPA. Although the operating license had not yet been issued, the AEC
rules prohibited any consideration of environmental issues unless raised by
one of the parties and specifically required that no consideration be given
to environmental factors by its hearing boards at proceedings officially
noticed before March 4, 1971. The court concluded that the rules contra-
vened the directives of section 102(2)(C), and that: "[a] full NEPA con-
sideration of alternatives in the original plans of a facility, then, is both
important and appropriate well before the operating license proceedings.
It is not duplicative if environmental issues were not considered in granting
the construction permit." Id. at 1128.
23. 455 F.2d 412 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 849 (1972).
24. 455 F.2d at 418-19.
1975]
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the hearing constituted an existing agency review process, 5 the
court found that the then existing Council on Environmental Qual-
ity (CEQ)26 guidelines27 "[flew] in the face of Section 102(2)(C) of
NEPA which explicitly requires the agency's own detailed state-
ment to 'accompany the proposal through the existing agency re-
view processes.' "2 Thus, the FPC was required to prepare an envi-
ronmental impact statement prior to the hearings."
The court in Greene County also reasoned that statements sub-
mitted by applicants, such as PASNY, would not satisfy NEPA's
requirements 0 because of "the potential, if not likelihood" of the
applicant's statement being based upon "self-serving assump-
tions,"I' and the probability that many intervenors would have lim-
ited financial resources and expertise and would therefore be unable
to present a complete analysis of all the environmental factors in-
volved 32
Although the ICC was fully aware of the holding of Greene
25. Id. at 422.
26. The Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ) was established
pursuant to NEPA, 42 U.S.C. § 4342 (1970). Composed of three members
appointed by the President, the Council is charged with various duties
including development and recommendation to the President of national
policies to improve environmental quality, conduct of research and investi-
gations relating to the environment, review and appraisal of programs of
the federal government in view of national environmental policy, and
assisting and advising the President in the preparation of the Environmen-
tal Quality Report. Id. § 4344(1). The Council also publishes guidelines
which are designed to assist federal agencies in meeting the requirements
of NEPA. These guidelines are advisory in nature. Greene County Plan-
ning Bd. v. FPC, 455 F.2d 412, 421 (2d Cir. 1972). However, the guidelines
may be accorded substantial weight since they constitute the interpreta-
tion of NEPA by the agency charged with implementation of the Act. See,
e.g., Environmental Defense Fund v. TVA, 339 F. Supp. 806, 811 (E.D.
Tenn.), aff'd, 468 F.2d 1164 (6th Cir. 1972). For an argument that the
guidelines issued by the CEQ do have the force of law, see 1972 DUKE L.J.
667, 677 (1972).
27. 36 Fed. Reg. 7724-27 (1971).
28. 455 F.2d at 421.
29. Id. at 422.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 420.
32. Id.
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County, it nevertheless attempted in Harlem Valley to bypass that
decision33 and the revised CEQ guidelines complying therewith,34
and rely on its own procedural regulations, which were promulgated
prior to Greene County but published after that decision was
handed down.35 It argued that Harlem Valley was void on jurisdic-
33. As brought out by the court in Harlem Valley, several abortive
attempts to render Greene County ineffective were made before the
Harlem Valley litigation was commenced. In fact, in Harlem Valley some
of the arguments raised prior to the litigation were repeated. The ICC
made a motion to submit a memorandum to support the FPC's motion for
a rehearing on the grounds that Greene County would require a substantial
revision of its procedures. The ICC motion was denied, as was the Solicitor
General's petition for certiorari which advanced similar arguments. 500
F.2d at 332. The ICC made another attempt to circumvent Greene County
by filing a petition for modification of the CEQ guidelines on the grounds
that a substantial staff increase would be required. The CEQ chairman
refused the petition for modification, pointing out that the estimated re-
quired staff increase of twenty percent was not realistic in view of estiinates
made by other agencies. Id.
34. 38 Fed. Reg. 20550 (1973). Section 1500.7(d) of the CEQ guidelines
specifically provides: "Agency procedures developed pursuant to §
1500.3(a) of these guidelines should indicate as explicitly as possible those
types of agency decisions or actions which utilize hearings as part of the
normal agency review process, either as a result of statutory requirement
or agency practice . . . .Agencies should make any draft environmental
statements to be issued available to the public at least fifteen (15) days
prior to the time of such hearings." Id. at 20553.
35. 49 C.F.R. § 1100.250 (1973). The ICC report accompanying the
regulation provided in part: "The guidelines finally adopted by the Coun-
cil on Environmental Quality . . .require each agency responsible for a
major Federal action significantly affecting the quality of the human envi-
ronment to prepare and circulate to the Council and other appropriate
government agencies a draft environmental impact statement. A final
impact statement is to be similarly prepared and circulated after com-
ments have been received on the draft statements. The essential question
to be resolved at this point, which has been specifically raised by [the
Department of Transportation], concerns the methods which this Com-
mission should utilize in issuing draft and final environmental impact
statements. All Commission hearings (whether oral or on the written re-
cord) in proceedings involving environmental issues will be public ones
subject to the Administrative Procedure Act. We believe, and the Council
has informally advised, that draft impact statements are not necessary in
any of these proceedings. As a consequence, and in compliance with the
1975]
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tional grounds,3" that the district court had engaged in an inappro-
priate "wooden application" of Greene County,37 and that Greene
County was distinguishable from Harlem Valley.
The jurisdictional arguments were viewed as mere "procedural
hurdles"38 and were found to be without merit. The court was also
Council's requirements, an environmental impact statement will be issued
together with and as part of each initial determination made as a result of
any hearing (oral or written), in those cases determined to involve environ-
mental issues. The impact statement and initial determination will be
circulated to the appropriate government agencies and made available to
the public in the manner prescribed by the Council." 340 I.C.C. 431, 441-
42 (1972) (emphasis in original).
36. 500 F.2d at 332.
37. Id. at 335.
38. The defendants made three arguments that the court lacked juris-
diction to hear the case. First, they claimed that only a three-judge court
could issue such an injunction. They cited as controlling the provisions of
the Urgent Deficiencies Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2321-25 (1970). Section 2325 of
that Act provides that a three-judge court shall determine whether to issue
an injunction "restraining the enforcement, operation or execution, in
whole or in part, of any order of the Interstate Commerce Commission
. " The court of appeals cited extensive authority in support of its
finding "that not every determination of the ICC is an 'order' for purposes
of the Urgent Deficiencies Act." 500 F.2d at 332. It further agreed with the
district court that a procedural regulation specifying when the ICC must
issue its impact statement under NEPA in an abandonment proceeding is
not the kind of determination requiring review by a three-judge court
under the Urgent Deficiencies Act. Id. at 333. Secondly, the defendants
argued that the court did not have jurisdiction to review the ICC rules
under any other statutory provision. The court held that the case was "a
proper case for an action in the nature of mandamus under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1361" since the ICC might have a statutory duty under NEPA to have
its staff prepare a statement prior to any hearings. Id. at 334. Finally, the
defendants argued that judicial review of the case was barred because
plaintiffs had failed to exhaust administrative remedies. The court again
agreed with the district court and decided that the ICC argument was in
essence one of finality or ripeness for review. As to the question of finality,
the court relied upon the finding of the United States Supreme Court in
Port of Boston Marine Terminal Ass'n v. Rederiaktiebolaget Transatlan-
tic, 400 U.S. 62 (1970), that "the relevant considerations in determining
finality are whether the process of administrative decisionmaking has
reached a stage where judicial review will not disrupt the orderly process
of adjudication and whether rights or obligations have been determined or
[Vol. III
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unconvinced by the allegation of "wooden application" since two
other courts had either stated or implied that Greene County did
apply to the ICC.39
Two bases for differentiating Greene County from Harlem Valley
were advanced. The ICC first argued that the FPC staff, unlike its
own, participated in the examination of applications prior to an
environmental hearing.'" The implication was that since the ICC
staff did not participate in the examination of applications prior to
such hearings, the ICC did not have a staff adequate to draft an
impact statement. Therefore, the ICC contended that "the Greene
County requirement that an impact statement be served by the
participating agency staff member prior to the hearing is entirely
inappropriate."" The argument was rejected by the court of ap-
peals, which found that the ICC had previously recognized its af-
firmative duty under NEPA and had failed to meet that duty.2
Several justifications were enumerated by the court. First, as had
been pointed out in Greene County, complainants seeking a NEPA
hearing might not have sufficient resources to present a complete
legal consequences will flow from the agency action." Id. at 71. In Harlem
Valley there was no proceeding to disrupt, an interlocutory challenge to a
specific environmental statement was not involved, and the case did not
involve the interlocutory exclusion of certain matters from a hearing. What
was involved was simply a review of a set of procedural rules for imple-
menting NEPA that the ICC would apply to all abandonment proceedings
before it. On the issue of ripeness, the court found that the case was ripe
for review because of the strain on the resources of the environmental
intervenors if review were postponed and because of the serious conse-
quences for the ICC and all interested parties if a later court should find
that the proceedings had been inadequate. 500 F.2d at 335.
39. Id. at 335. In City of New York v. United States, 344 F. Supp. 929(E.D.N.Y. 1972), preparation by the ICC of an impact statement in ad-
vance of a hearing on the proposed abandonment by a railroad of its entire
operation was found to be "procedure consonant with that mandated" by
the court in Greene County. Id. at 939. In Students Challenging Regulatory
Agency Procedures v. United States, 346 F. Supp. 189 (D.D.C. 1972), rev'dfor lack of juris., 412 U.S. 669 (1973), the court noted that a statement
prepared by the railroad parties to the action would not satisfy the require-
ments of NEPA, referring again to Greene County. Id. at 193 n.4.
40. 500 F.2d at 335.
41. 360 F. Supp. at 1065, quoting Brief for Defendant at 25.
42. 500 F.2d at 336.
1975]
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picture of the environmental factors involved, while the applicant
to the federal agency might well submit a self-serving statement. 3
Next, as was also pointed out in Greene County, there was no way
to escape the literal language of NEPA which required that state-
ments accompany the proposal throughout the entire agency review
process." Finally, the court examined the Interstate Commerce Act
and found that nothing therein "prohibit[ed] the ICC staff from
investigating environmental matters and preparing a draft impact
statement, if needed, prior to any public hearings."45
The second argument raised by the ICC to differentiate Harlem
Valley and Greene County was that in the latter case it was clear
that an impact statement was required, whereas it was not clear in
the many proceedings before the ICC whether such a statement was
necessary. On addressing this argument the court considered the
proposal which the CEQ director made to the ICC staff to the effect
that the administrative law judge could make the initial determina-
tion of whether an impact statement was required. If he decided
affirmatively, the judge could adjourn the hearing and prepare the
statement. 7 The court found the proposal to be inadequate, as the
administrative law judge would not have the requisite staff assis-
tance to arrive at a "fair and informed preliminary decision." 48 Thus
there could be no question that the staff of the responsible federal
agency had to participate in making the threshold decision.4"
The court's rationale was rooted in solid precedent. Hanly v.
Kleindienst (Hanly 1)10 held that the requirement of NEPA section
102(2)(B) applied regardless of whether the agency determined that
an environmental impact statement was required.5 Section
102(2)(B) provides that all federal agencies "identify and develop
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 335.
47. Id. at 332.
48. Id. at 337, quoting Hanly v. Kleindienst, 471 F.2d 823, 835 (2d Cir.
1972).
49. 500 F.2d at 337.
50. 471 F.2d 823 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 908 (1973); see 1973
WASH. U.L.Q. 235 (1973).
51. 471 F.2d at 835-36.
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methods and procedures . . which will ensure that presently un-
quantified environmental amenities and values may be given appro-
priate consideration . "..."52 The court in Hanly II required that
the same factors be considered in making a threshold determination
as in making an environmental impact statement.53 Thus, to ensure
the consideration of all essential information, the responsible
agency is required to maintain a sufficient staff to make the thresh-
old determination.
The court in Harlem Valley gives very little indication of what
factors must be considered by the ICC in making its threshold deci-
sion. It merely held that the determination had to be governed by
"a rule of reason, similar to that used in determining whether cer-
tain matters must be considered in the impact statement itself."'54
This limited delineation was intentional; the court feared that if the
standards set down were too rigid the prediction of Justice Harlan
that "they are apt in their application to carry unintended conse-
quences which once accomplished are not always easy to repair"55
might be borne out.56 The court did, however, remind the ICC that
under Hanly II "it [had] an affirmative obligation to develop a
reviewable record of this threshold determination. . . . and its deci-
sion on this matter must be sufficiently reasoned so that a reviewing
court can determine whether or not it was arbitrary or capricious
''57
The ICC has not been left without some operational guidelines.58
An indication of the factors to be considered is supplied by the court
in City of New York v. United States (City of New York II),5 which
approved an ICC decision allowing abandonment. Generally, each
52. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(B) (1970).
53. 471 F.2d at 835.
54. 500 F.2d at 337.
55. Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1, 32 (1963) (dissenting opin-
ion).
56. 500 F.2d at 337.
57. Id.
58. See 2 FORDHAM URBAN L.J. 419 (1974).
59. 344 F. Supp. 929 (E.D.N.Y. 1972). This is the second of a pair of
cases commonly referred to as City of New York I and City of New York
II. The other case, City of New York v. United States, 337 F. Supp. 150
(E.D.N.Y. 1972), is discussed at note 8 supra.
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of the five areas outlined in NEPA section 102(2)(C)60 should be
considered." Such consideration should include the potential envi-
ronmental impact on a larger area than that within which the rail-
road operates." In City of New York II, the court examined the
possible increased traffic congestion in other geographical areas due
to the probable increase in the number of trucks. Also examined
were the environmental implications of soil, water, noise, and land
pollution.13 In short, the approach of the reviewing agency should be
"interdisciplinary . . .taking into account the 'natural and social
sciences and the environmental design arts' . 64
Hanly II also provides the ICC with decisive precedent to aid in
its threshold determination. The Hanly II court attempted to define
the meaning of the word "significantly" so that agencies in the "so-
called grey areas" would issue an impact statement rather than face
the "delay and expense of protracted litigation."65 Thus, in deciding
whether the federal action will significantly affect the quality of the
environment:
the agency in charge, although vested with broad discretion, should normally
be required to review the proposed action in the light of at least two relevant
factors: (1) the extent to which the action will cause adverse environmental
effects in excess of those created by existing uses in the area affected by it,
and (2) the absolute quantitative adverse environmental effects of the action
itself, including the cumulative harm that results from its contribution to
existing adverse conditions or uses in the affected area. Where conduct con-
forms to existing uses, its adverse consequences will usually be less signifi-
cant than when it represents a radical change. Absent some showing that an
entire neighborhood is in the process of redevelopment, its existing environ-
ment, though frequently below an ideal standard, represents a norm that
cannot be ignored . . . .Hence the absolute, as well as comparative, effects
of a major federal action must be considered."
This definition incorporates the Calvert Cliffs' balancing of "envi-
ronmental amenities" with "economic and technical considera-
60. See note 15 supra.
61. See 344 F. Supp. at 938.
62. Id. at 939.
63. Id. at 936-37, 938 n.15.
64. 471 F.2d at 835. See also 38 Fed. Reg. 20550, 20552 (1973).
65. 471 F.2d at 831-32.
66. Id. at 830-31. See also 38 Fed. Reg. 20550, 20551 (1973).
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tions."67 Accordingly, when all environmental factors were weighed
in the abandonment proceedings in City of New York II, the eco-
nomic considerations -of a nearly insolvent railroad were found to
outweigh any adverse environmental impacts. 8 The paucity of facts
in the court's record in Harlem Valley precludes determining
whether an impact statement is required.
Whatever decision the ICC makes will have to be made on the
basis of a reviewable record. A "terse" statement will be sufficient
if it takes into account all of the requisite environmental factors, 9
but "perfunctory and conclusory language [will not] suffice, even
for purposes of a threshold section 102(2)(C) determination."7 The
more controversial the proposed action the more thorough the re-
cord for review should be.7
Should a negative decision by the ICC be appealed, the court will
apply the "arbitrary and capricious" standard for review set forth
in the Administrative Procedure Act. 2 Under that test the facts will
be "scrutinized to determine whether the agency decision was 'arbi-
67. Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm. v. AEC, 449 F.2d 1109, 1113
(D.C. Cir. 1971).
68. 344 F. Supp. at 938. It should be pointed out that NEPA does not
compel the abandonment of any railroad line, but merely requires that an
environmental impact statement be prepared.
69. See Hanly v. Mitchell, 460 F.2d 640, 646 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409
U.S. 990 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Hanly I].
70. 460 F.2d at 647.
71. In Hanly I, the court considered the same factors with respect to
two buildings. Id. at 646-47. It approved the terse statement regarding a
nine-story office building, but found the statement with respect to the
adjacent detention center to be "perfunctory and conclusory" and there-
fore inadequate. Id.
72. See Administrative Procedure Act § 10(e), 5 U.S.C. §§
706(2) (A), (D) (1970), which provides: "To the extent necessary to decision
and when presented, the reviewing court shall decide all relevant questions
of law, interpret constitutional and statutory provisions, and determine
the meaning or applicability of the terms of an agency action. The review-
ing court shall . . . . (2) hold unlawful and set aside agency action,
findings, and conclusions found to be-(A) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse
of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law . . . . (D) without
observance of procedure required by law . . . ." The arbitrary and capri-
cious test was also adopted by the Supreme Court in Citizens to Preserve
Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971).
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trary, capricious, an abuse of discretion or otherwise not in accord-
ance with law' . . and whether the agency followed the necessary
procedural requirements.""
Harlem Valley adds to the "flood of new litigation-litigation
seeking judicial assistance in protecting our national environment"
which was promised by the Calvert Cliffs' court.74 It is an addition
required to prevent a large and powerful federal agency from cir-
cumventing the judicial holding of Greene County. Greene County
had established the rule that federal agencies, prior to a hearing,
could not depend on statements prepared by applicants; rather,
they must make their own NEPA threshold decision and, if neces-
sary, prepare their own environmental impact statement. 5 In
Harlem Valley the court made it clear that the procedural require-
ments laid down in Greene County were not a "paper tiger,"7 and
that such "footdragging agencies"" as the ICC would be forced to
comply with the mandates of that decision.
Helen Gerard
73. 471 F.2d at 829. The Fifth Circuit applies a "reasonableness test."
See, e.g., Save Our Ten Acres v. Kreger, 472 F.2d 463, 466 (5th Cir. 1973).
The Supreme Court, with respect to a review of mixed questions of fact
and law, such as are involved in a review of a decision made pursuant to
NEPA, has applied a "rational basis" test by which a decision of an agency
will be accepted if it has" 'warrant in the record"' and a "reasonable basis
in law." NLRB v. Hearst Publications, 322 U.S. 111, 131 (1944). See also
471 F.2d at 829 n.9; Comment, The Role of the Courts Under the National
Environmental Policy Act, 23 CATHOLIC U.L. REV. 300 (1973).
74. 449 F.2d at 1111.
75. See notes 23-32 supra and accompanying text.
76. 449 F.2d at 1114.
77. Id.
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